Symmetric Strategy Improvement by Schewe, Sven et al.
Symmetric Strategy Improvement
Sven Schewe1, Ashutosh Trivedi2, and Thomas Varghese1
1Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool
2Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology – Bombay
Abstract
Symmetry is inherent in the definition of most of the two-player zero-sum games, including
parity, mean-payoff, and discounted-payoff games. It is therefore quite surprising that no symmetric
analysis techniques for these games exist. We develop a novel symmetric strategy improvement
algorithm where, in each iteration, the strategies of both players are improved simultaneously. We
show that symmetric strategy improvement defies Friedmann’s traps, which shook the belief in the
potential of classic strategy improvement to be polynomial.
1 Introduction
We study turn-based graph games between two players—Player Min and Player Max—who take turns to
move a token along the vertices of a coloured finite graph so as to optimise their adversarial objectives.
Various classes of graph games are characterised by the objective of the players, for instance in parity
games the objective is to optimise the parity of the dominating colour occurring infinitely often, while in
discounted and mean-payoff games the objective is the discounted and limit-average sum of the colours.
Solving graph games is the central and most expensive step in many model checking [16, 8, 30, 6, 1],
satisfiability checking [30, 16, 28, 26], and synthesis [22, 27] algorithms. More efficient algorithms for
solving graph games will therefore foster the development of performant model checkers and contribute
to bringing synthesis techniques to practice.
Parity games enjoy a special status among graph games and the quest for performant algorithms
[16, 9, 7, 20, 32, 4, 31, 15, 19, 23, 29, 3, 21, 17, 2, 14, 24, 25, 10] for solving them has therefore been
an active field of research during the last decades. Traditional forward techniques (≈ O(n 12 c) [15] for
parity games with n positions and c colours), backward techniques (≈ O(nc) [20, 9, 31]), and their
combination (≈O(n 13 c) [24]) provide good complexity bounds. However, these bounds are sharp, and
techniques with good complexity bounds [24, 15] frequently display their worst case complexity on
practical examples. Strategy improvement algorithms [19, 23, 29, 3, 25, 10], on the other hand, are
closely related to the Simplex algorithm for solving linear programming problems that perform well in
practice.
Classic strategy improvement algorithms are built around the existence of optimal positional strate-
gies for both players. They start with an arbitrary positional strategy for a player and iteratively compute
a better positional strategy in every step until the strategy cannot be further improved. Since there are
only finitely many positional strategies in a finite graph, termination is guaranteed. The crucial step
in a strategy improvement algorithm is to compute a better strategy from the current strategy. Given a
current strategy σ of a player (say, Player Max), this step is performed by first computing the globally
optimal counter strategy τ cσ of the opponent (Player Min) and then computing the value of each vertex
of the game restricted to the strategies σ and τ cσ. For the games under discussion (parity, discounted,
and mean-payoff) both of these computations are simple and tractable. This value dictates potentially
locally profitable changes or switches Prof(σ) that Player Max can make vis-à-vis his previous strategy
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σ. For the correctness of the strategy improvement algorithm it is required that such locally profitable
changes imply a global improvement. The strategy of Player Max can then be updated according to a
switching rule (akin to pivoting rule of the Simplex) in order to give an improved strategy. This has led
to the following template for classic strategy improvement algorithms.
Algorithm 1: Classic strategy improvement algorithm
1 determine an optimal counter strategy τ cσ for σ
2 evaluate the game for σ and τ cσ and determine the profitable changes Prof(σ) for σ
3 update σ by applying changes from Prof(σ) to σ
A number of switching rules, including the ones inspired by Simplex pivoting rules, have been
suggested for strategy improvement algorithms. The most widespread ones are to select changes for all
game states where this is possible, choosing a combination of those with an optimal update guarantee,
or to choose uniformly at random. For some classes of games, it is also possible to select an optimal
combination of updates [25]. There have also been suggestions to use more advanced randomisation
techniques with sub-exponential – 2O(
√
n) – bounds [3] and snare memory [10]. Unfortunately, all of
these techniques have been shown to be exponential in the size of the game [11, 12, 13].
Classic strategy improvement algorithms treat the two players involved quite differently where at
each iteration one player computes a globally optimal counter strategy, while the other player performs
local updates. In contrast, a symmetric strategy improvement algorithm symmetrically improves the
strategies of both players at the same time, and uses the finding to guide the strategy improvement. This
suggests the following naïve symmetric approach.
Algorithm 2: Naïve symmetric strategy improvement algorithm
1 determine τ ′ = τ cσ determine σ′ = σcτ
2 update σ to σ′ update τ to τ ′
This algorithm has earlier been suggested by Condon [5] where it was shown that a repeated applica-
tion of this update can lead to cycles [5]. A problem with this naïve approach is that there is no guarantee
that the primed strategies are generally better than the unprimed ones. With hindsight this is maybe not
very surprising, as in particular no improvement in the evaluation of running the game with σ′, τ ′ can
be expected over running the game with σ, τ , as an improvement for one player is on the expense of the
other. This observation led to the approach being abandoned. In this paper we propose the following
more careful symmetric strategy improvement algorithm that guarantees improvements in each iteration
similar to classic strategy improvement.
Algorithm 3: Symmetric strategy improvement algorithm
1 determine τ cσ determine σ
c
τ
2 determine Prof(σ) for σ determine Prof(τ) for τ
3 update σ using Prof(σ) ∩ σcτ update τ using Prof(τ) ∩ τ cσ
The main difference to classic strategy improvement approaches is that we exploit the strategy of
the other player to inform the search for a good improvement step. In this algorithm we select only such
updates to the two strategies that agree with the optimal counter strategy to the respective other’s strategy.
We believe that this will provide a gradually improving advice function that will lead to few iterations.
We support this assumption by showing that this algorithm suffices to escape the traps Friedmann has
laid to establish lower bounds for different types of strategy improvement algorithms [11, 12, 13].
2
2 Preliminaries
We focus on turn-based zero-sum games played between two players—Player Max and Player Min—
over finite graphs. A game arena A is a tuple (VMax, VMin, E, C, φ) where (V = VMax ∪ VMin, E) is a
finite directed graph with the set of vertices V partitioned into a set VMax of vertices controlled by Player
Max and a set VMin of vertices controlled by Player Min, E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges, C is a set of
colours, φ : V → C is the colour mapping. We require that every vertex has at least one outgoing edge.
A turn-based game overA is played between players by moving a token along the edges of the arena.
A play of such a game starts by placing a token on some initial vertex v0 ∈ V . The player controlling
this vertex then chooses a successor vertex v1 such that (v0, v1) ∈ E and the token is moved to this
successor vertex. In the next turn the player controlling the vertex v1 chooses the successor vertex v2
with (v1, v2) ∈ E and the token is moved accordingly. Both players move the token over the arena in
this manner and thus form a play of the game. Formally, a play of a game over A is an infinite sequence
of vertices 〈v0, v1, . . .〉 ∈ V ω such that, for all i ≥ 0, we have that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E. We write PlaysA(v)
for the set of plays over A starting from vertex v ∈ V and PlaysA for the set of plays of the game. We
omit the subscript when the arena is clear from the context. We extend the colour mapping φ : V → C
from vertices to plays by defining the mapping φ : Plays→ Cω as 〈v0, v1, . . .〉 7→ 〈φ(v0), φ(v1), . . .〉.
Definition 2.1 (Graph Games). A graph game G is a tuple (A, η,≺) such thatA is an arena, η : Cω → D
is an evaluation function where D is the carrier set of a complete space, and ≺ is a preference ordering
over D.
Example 2.2. Parity, mean-payoff and discounted payoff games are graph games (A, η,≺) played
on game arenas A = (VMax, VMin, E,R, φ). For mean payoff games the evaluation function is η :
〈c0, c1, . . .〉 7→ lim infi→∞ 1i
∑i−1
j=0 cj , while for discounted payoff games with discount factor λ ∈
[0, 1) it is η : 〈c0, c1, . . .〉 7→
∑∞
i=0 λ
ici with ≺ as the natural order over the reals. For (max) parity
games the evaluation function is η : 〈c0, c1, . . .〉 7→ lim supi→∞ ci often used with a preference order
≺parity where higher even colours are preferred over smaller even colours, even colours are preferred
over odd colours, and smaller odd colours are preferred over higher odd colours.
In the remainder of this paper, we will use parity games where every colour is unique, i.e., where φ
is injective. All parity games can be translated into such games as discussed in [29]. For these games,
we use a valuation function based on their progress measure. We define η as 〈c0, c1, . . .〉 7→ (c, C, d),
where c = lim supi→∞ ci is the dominant colour of the colour sequence, d = min{i ∈ ω | ci = c} is the
index of the first occurrence of c, and C = {ci | i < d, ci > c} is the set of colours that occur before the
first occurrence of c. The preference order is defined as the following: we have (c′, C ′, d′) ≺ (c, C, d) if
• c′ ≺parity c,
• c=c′, the highest colour h in the symmetric difference between C and C ′ is even, and in C,
• c=c′, the highest colour h in the symmetric difference between C and C ′ is odd, and in C ′,
• c = c′ is even, C = C ′, and d < d′, or
• c = c′ is odd, C = C ′, and d > d′.
Definition 2.3 (Strategies). A strategy of Player Max is a function σ : V ∗VMax → V such that(
v, σ(piv)
) ∈ E for all pi ∈ V ∗ and v ∈ VMax. Similarly, a strategy of Player Min is a function
τ : V ∗VMin → V such that
(
v, σ(piv)
) ∈ E for all pi ∈ V ∗ and v ∈ VMin. We write Σ∞ and T∞ for the
set of strategies of Player Max and Player Min, respectively.
Definition 2.4 (Valuation). For a strategy pair (σ, τ) ∈ Σ∞×T∞ and an initial vertex v ∈ V we denote
the unique play starting from the vertex v by pi(v, σ, τ) and we write valG(v, σ, τ) for the value of the
vertex v under the strategy pair (σ, τ) defined as
valG(v, σ, τ)
def
= η
(
φ(pi(v, σ, τ))
)
.
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Figure 1: Parity game arena with four vertices and unique colours.
We also define the concept of the value of a strategy σ ∈ Σ∞ and τ ∈ T∞ as
valG(v, σ)
def
= inf
τ∈T∞
valG(v, σ, τ) and valG(v, τ)
def
= sup
σ∈Σ∞
valG(v, σ, τ).
We also extend the valuation for vertices to a valuation for the whole game by defining V dimensional
vectors valG(σ) : v 7→ valG(v, σ) with the usual V dimensional partial order v, where val v val′ if, and
only if, val(v)  val′(v) holds for all v ∈ V .
Definition 2.5 (Positional Determinacy). We say that a strategy σ ∈ Σ∞ is memoryless or positional
if it only depends on the last state, i.e. for all pi, pi′ ∈ V ∗ and v ∈ VMax we have that σ(piv) = σ(pi′v).
Thus, a positional strategy can be viewed as a function σ : VMax → V such that for all v ∈ VMax we
have that (v, σ(v)) ∈ E. The concept of positional strategies of Player Min is defined in an analogous
manner. We write Σ and T for the set of positional strategies of Players Max and Min, respectively. We
say that a game is positionally determined if:
• valG(v, σ) = minτ∈T valG(v, σ, τ) holds for all σ ∈ Σ,
• valG(v, τ) = maxσ∈Σ valG(v, σ, τ) holds for all τ ∈ T ,
• Existence of value: for all v ∈ V maxσ∈Σ valG(v, σ) = minτ∈T valG(v, τ) holds, and we use
valG(v) to denote this value, and
• Existence of positional optimal strategies: there is a pair τmin, σmax of strategies such that, for
all v ∈ V , valG(v) = valG(v, σmax) = valG(v, τmin) holds. Observe that for all σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ T
we have that valG(σmax) w valG(σ) and valG(τmin) v valG(τ).
Observe that (first and second item above) that classes of games with positional strategies guarantee
an optimal positional counter strategy for Player Min to all strategies σ ∈ Σ of Player Max. We denote
these strategies by τ cσ. Similarly, we denote the optimal positional counter strategy for Player Max to a
strategy τ ∈ T by σcτ of Player Min. While this counter strategy is not necessarily unique, we use the
convention in all proofs that τ cσ is always the same counter strategy for σ ∈ Σ, and σcτ is always the
same counter strategy for τ ∈ T .
Example 2.6. Consider the parity game arena shown in Figure 1. We use circles for the vertices of
Player Max and squares for Player Min. We label each vertex with its colour. Notice that a positional
strategy can be depicted just by specifying an outgoing edge for all the vertices of a player. The positional
strategies σ of Player Max is depicted in blue and the positional strategy τ of Player Min is depicted
in red. In the example, val(1, σ, τ) = (1, ∅, 0), val(4, σ, τ) = (3, {4}, 1), val(3, σ, τ) = (3, ∅, 0), and
val(0, σ, τ) = (0, ∅, 0).
2.1 Classic Strategy Improvement Algorithm
As discussed in the introduction, classic strategy improvement algorithms work well for classes of games
that are positionally determined. Moreover, the evaluation function should be such that one can easily
identify the set Prof(σ) of profitable updates and reach an optimum exactly where there are no profitable
updates. We formalise these prerequisites for a class of games to be good for strategy improvement
algorithm in this section.
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Definition 2.7 (Profitable Updates). For a strategy σ ∈ Σ, an edge (v, v′) ∈ E with v ∈ VMax is a
profitable update if σ′ ∈ Σ with σ′ : v 7→ v′ and σ′ : v′′ 7→ σ(v′′) for all v′′ 6= v has a strictly greater
evaluation than σ, valG(σ′) A valG(σ). We write Prof(σ) for the set of profitable updates.
Example 2.8. In our example from Figure 1, τ = τ cσ is the optimal counter strategy to σ, such that
val(σ) = val(σ, τ). Prof(σ) = {(3, 4), (3, 0)}, because both the successor to the left and the successor
to the right have a better valuation, (3, {4}, 1) and (0, ∅, 0), respectively, than the successor on the
selected self-loop, (3, ∅, 0).
For a strategy σ and a functional (right-unique) subsets P ⊆ Prof(σ) we define the strategy σP with
σP : v 7→ v′ if (v, v′) ∈ P and σP : v 7→ σ(v) if there is no v′ ∈ V with (v, v′) ∈ P . For a class of
graph games, profitable updates are combinable if, for all strategies σ and all functional (right-unique)
subsets P ⊆ Prof(σ) we have that valG(σP ) A valG(σ). Moreover, we say that a class of graph games
is maximum identifying if Prof(σ) = ∅ ⇔ valG(σ) = valG . Algorithm 4 provides a generic template for
strategy improvement algorithms.
Algorithm 4: Classic strategy improvement algorithm
1 Let σ0 be an arbitrary positional strategy. Set i := 0.
2 If Prof(σi) = ∅ return σi
3 σi+1 := σi
P for some functional subset P ⊆ Prof(σ). Set i := i+ 1. go to 2.
We say that a class of games is good for max strategy improvement if they are positionally deter-
mined and have combinable and maximum identifying improvements.
Theorem 2.9. If a class of games is good for max strategy improvement then Algorithm 4 terminates
with an optimal strategy σ (valG(σ) = valG) for Player Max.
As a remark, we can drop the combinability requirement while maintaining correctness when we
restrict the updates to a single position, that is, when we require P to be singleton for every update.
We call such strategy improvement algorithms slow, and a class of games good for slow max strategy
improvement if it is maximum identifying and positionally determined.
Theorem 2.10. If a class of games is positionally determined games with maximum identifying improve-
ment then all slow strategy improvement algorithms terminate with an optimal strategy σ (valG(σ) =
valG) for Player Max.
The proof for both theorems is the same.
Proof. The strategy improvement algorithm will produce a sequence σ0, σ1, σ2 . . . of positional strate-
gies with increasing quality valG(σ0) @ valG(σ1) @ valG(σ2) @ . . .. As the set of positional strategies
is finite, this chain must be finite. As the game is maximum identifying, the stopping condition provides
optimality.
Various concepts and results extend naturally for analogous claims about Player Min. We call a class
of game good for strategy improvement if it is good for max strategy improvement and good for min
strategy improvement. Parity games, mean payoff games, and discounted payoff games are all good for
strategy improvement (for both players). Moreover, the calculation of Prof(σ) is cheap in all of these
instances, which makes them well suited for strategy improvement techniques.
3 Symmetric Strategy Improvement Algorithm
We first extend the termination argument for classic strategy improvement techniques (Theorems 2.9
and 2.10) to symmetric strategy improvement given as Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5: Symmetric strategy improvement algorithm
1 Let σ0 and τ0 be arbitrary positional strategies. set i := 0.
2 Determine σcτi and τ
c
σi
3 σi+1 := σi
P for P ⊆ Prof(σ) ∩ σcτi .
4 τi+1 := τi
P for P ⊆ Prof(τ) ∩ τ cσi .
5 if σi+1 = σi and τi+1 = τi return (σi, τi).
6 set i := i+ 1. go to 2.
3.1 Correctness
Lemma 3.1. The symmetric strategy improvement algorithm terminates for all classes of games that are
good for strategy improvement.
Proof. We first observe that the algorithm yields a sequence σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . of Player Max strategies
for G with improving values valG(σ0) v valG(σ1) v valG(σ2) v . . ., where equality, valG(σi) ≡
valG(σi+i), implies σi = σi+1. Similarly, for the sequence τ0, τ1, τ2, . . . of Player Min strategies for
G, the values valG(τ0) w valG(τ1) w valG(τ2) w . . ., improve (for Player Min), such that equality,
valG(τi) ≡ valG(τi+i), implies τi = τi+1. As the number of values that can be taken is finite, eventually
both values stabilise and the algorithm terminates.
What remains to be shown is that the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm cannot terminate
with an incorrect result. In order to show this, we first prove the weaker claim that it is optimal in
G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ) = (Vmax, Vmin, E′, val) such that E′ =
{(
v, σ(v)
) | v ∈ Vmax} ∪ {(v, τ(v)) | v ∈
Vmin
}∪{(v, σcτ (v)) | v ∈ Vmax}∪{(v, τ cσ(v)) | v ∈ Vmin} is the subgame of G whose edges are those
defined by the four positional strategies, when it terminates with the strategy pair σ, τ .
Lemma 3.2. When the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm terminates with the strategy pair σ, τ
on games that are good for strategy improvement, then σ and τ are the optimal strategies for Players
Max and Min, respectively, in G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ).
Proof. For G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ), both update steps are not restricted: the changes Player Max can potentially
select his updates from are the edges defined by σcτ at the vertices v ∈ Vmax where σ and σcτ differ
(σ(v) 6= σcτ (v)). Consequently, Prof(σ) = Prof(σ) ∩ σcτ .
Thus, σ = σ′ holds if, and only if, σ is the result of an update step when using classic strategy
improvement in G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ) when starting in σ. As game is maximum identifying, σ is the optimal
Player Max strategy for G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ).
Likewise, the Player Min can potentially select every updates from τ cσ, at vertices v ∈ Vmin and we
first get Prof(τ) = Prof(τ)∩ τ cσ with the same argument. As the game is minimum identifying, τ is the
optimal Player Min strategy for G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ).
We are now in a position to expand the optimality in the subgame G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ) from Lemma 3.2
to global optimality the valuation of these strategies for G.
Lemma 3.3. When the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm terminates with the strategy pair σ, τ
on a game G that is good for strategy improvement, then σ is an optimal Player Max strategy and τ an
optimal Player Min strategy.
Proof. Let σ, τ be the strategies returned by the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm for a game
G, and let L = G(σ, τ, σcτ , τ cσ) denote the local game from Lemma 3.2 defined by them. Lemma 3.2
has established optimality in L. Observing that the optimal responses in G to σ and τ , τ cσ and σcτ ,
respectively, are available in L, we first see that they are also optimal in L. Thus, we have
• valL(σ) ≡ valL(σ, τ cσ) ≡ valG(σ, τ cσ) and
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• valL(τ) ≡ valL(σcτ , τ) ≡ valG(σcτ , τ).
Optimality in L then provides valL(σ) = valL(τ). Putting these three equations together, we get
valG(σ, τ cσ) ≡ valG(σcτ , τ).
Taking into account that τ cσ and σ
c
τ are the optimal responses to σ and τ , respectively, in G, we expand
this to valG w valG(σ) ≡ valG(σ, τ cσ) ≡ valG(σcτ , τ) ≡ valG(τ) w valG and get valG ≡ valG(σ) ≡
valG(τ) ≡ valG(σ, τ).
The Lemmas in this subsection yield the following results.
Theorem 3.4. The symmetric strategy improvement algorithm is correct for games that are good for
strategy improvement.
Theorem 3.5. The slow symmetric strategy improvement algorithm is correct for positionally deter-
mined games that are maximum and minimum identifying.
We implemented our symmetric strategy improvement algorithm based on the progress measures
introduced by Vöge and Jurdzin´ski [29]. The first step is to determine the valuation for the optimal
counter strategies to and the valuations for σ and τ .
Example 3.6. In our running example from Figure 1, we have discussed in the previous section that τ
is the optimal counter strategy τ cσ and that Prof(σ) = {(3, 4), (3, 0)}. In the optimal counter strategy σcτ
to τ , Player Max moves from 3 to 4, and we get val(1, τ) = (1, ∅, 0), val(4, τ) = (4, ∅, 0), val(3, τ) =
(4, ∅, 1), and val(0, τ) = (0, ∅, 0). Consequently, Prof(τ) = {(4, 1)}. For the update of σ, we select
the intersection of Prof(σ) and σcτ . In our example, this is the edge from 3 to 4 (depicted in green). To
update τ , we select the intersection of Prof(τ) and τ cσ. In our example, this intersection is empty, as the
current strategy τ agrees with τ cσ.
3.2 A minor improvement on stopping criteria
In this subsection, we look at a minor albeit natural improvement over Algorithm 5 shown in Algo-
rithm 6. There we used termination on both sides as a condition to terminate the algorithm. We could
alternatively check if either player has reached an optimum. Once this is the case, we can return the
optimal strategy and an optimal counter strategy to it.
Algorithm 6: Symmetric strategy improvement algorithm (Improved Stopping criteria)
1 Let σ0 and τ0 be arbitrary positional strategies. set i := 0.
2 Determine σcτi and τ
c
σi
3 if Prof(σi) = ∅ return (σi, τ cσi);
4 if Prof(τi) = ∅ return (σcτi , τi);
5 σi+1 := σi
P for P ⊆ Prof(σ) ∩ σcτi .
6 τi+1 := τi
P for P ⊆ Prof(τ) ∩ τ cσi .
7 set i := i+ 1. go to 2.
The correctness of this stopping condition is provided by Theorems 2.9 and 2.10, and checking this
stopping condition is usually cheap: it suffices to check if Prof(σ) or Prof(τ) is empty. This provides us
with a small optimisation, as we can stop as soon as one of the strategies involved is optimal. However
this small optimisation can only provide a small advantage.
Theorem 3.7. The difference in the number of iterations of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 is at most
linear in the number of states of G.
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Figure 2: Friedmann’s lower bound game for the locally optimal strategy improvement algorithm
Proof. Let σ be an optimal strategy for G. When starting with a strategy pair σ, τ0 for some strategy
τ0 of Player Min, we first construct the optimal counter strategies τ cσ and στ0 . As σ is optimal and G
maximum identifying, Prof(σ) = ∅, and strategy improvement will not change it. In particular, our
algorithm will always provide σ′ = σ, irrespective of the optimal counter strategy σcτi to a strategy τi
of Player Min. This also implies that τ cσ will not change. It is now easy to see that, unless τ
′
i = τi,
τi+1 = τ
′
i differs from τi in at least one decision, and it differs by adhering to τ
c
σ at the positions where
it differs (∀v ∈ Vmin. τi(v) 6= τi+1(v) ⇒ τi+1(v) = τ cσ(v)). Such an update can happen at most once
for each Player Min position. The argument for starting with an optimal strategy τ of Player Min is
similar.
4 Friedmann’s Traps
In a seminal work on the complexity of strategy improvement [11], Friedmann uses a class of parity
games called 1-sink parity games. These games contain a sink node with the weakest odd parity in a
max-parity game. This sink node is reachable from every other node in the game and such a game is
won by Player Min eventually. Figure 2 shows a lower bound game from [11].
In order to obtain an exponential lower bound for the classic strategy improvement algorithm with
the locally optimising policy, these sink games implement a binary counter realised by a gadget called
a cycle gate which consists of two components. With n cycle gates, we have a representation of the n
bits for an n bit counter. The first component of a cycle gate is called a simple cycle. In Figure 2, the
three smaller boxes shown in yellow are the simple cycles of the game. These simple cycles encode
the bits of the counter. The second component of the cycle gate gadget is called a deceleration lane.
This structure serves to ensure that any profitable updates to strategies are postponed by cycling through
seemingly more profitable improvements, in the order r, s, a1, a2, . . ., before eventually turning to ei.
This structure is shown as a shaded blue rectangle in Figure 2.
A simple cycle consists of exactly one Player Max controlled node d with a weak odd colour k and
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one Player Min controlled node e with the even colour k + 1. The Player Max node is also connected
to some set of external nodes in the game and the Player Min node is connected to an output node with
a high even colour on a path to the sink node. Given a strategy σ, we say that a simple cycle is closed
if we have an edge σ(d) = e. Otherwise, we say that the simple cycle is open. Opening and closing
cycles correspond to unsetting and setting bits. We then say a cycle gate is open or closed when its
corresponding simple cycle is open or closed respectively.
In these lower bound games, the simple cycles are connected to the deceleration lane in such a way
that lower valued cycles have less edges entering the deceleration lane ensuring that lower open cycles
close before higher open cycles. This allows the lesser significant bits to be set and reset before the
higher significant bits.
The deceleration lane hides sensible improvements, thus making the players take more iterations
before taking the best improvement. It is then shown in [11] that incrementing a bit state always requires
more than one strategy iteration in 4 different phases. This gadget thus counts an exponential number of
improvement steps taken by the strategy improvement algorithm to flip n bits. For a detailed exposition
of the gadget and the exponential lower bound construction, we refer the reader to [11].
4.1 Escaping the traps with symmetric strategy improvement
We discuss the effect of symmetric strategy improvement on Friedmann’s traps, with a focus on the
simple cycles. Simple cycles are the central component of the cycle gates and the heart of the lower
bound proof. As described above, an n-bit counter is represented by n cycle gates, each cycle gate
embedding a smaller simple cycle. These simple cycles are reused exponentially often to represent n
bits. Both players have the choice to open or close the simple cycles.
The optimal strategy of both players in the simple cycles of Figure 2 is to turn right. (For Player
Max, one could say that he wants to leave the cycle, and for Player Min, one could say that she wants
to stay in it.) When the players agree to stay in the cycle, Player Max wins the parity game. In fact
these are the only places where Player Max can win positionally in this parity game. When running the
symmetric strategy improvement algorithm for Player Max, the optimal counter strategy by Player Min
is to move to the right in simple cycles where Player Max is moving to the right, and to move left in all
other simple cycles.
As mentioned before, Friedmann [11] showed that, when looking at an abstraction of the Player Max
strategy that only distinguishes the decisions of turning right or not turning right in the simple cycles,
then they essentially behave like a binary counter that, with some delay (caused by the deceleration lane)
will ‘count up’. More precisely, one step after the ith bit has been activated, all lower bits are reset.
We now discuss how symmetric strategy improvement can beat this mechanism by taking the view
of both players into account. For this, we consider a starting configuration, where Player Min moves to
the right in the j most significant simple cycle positions, where j can be 0. Note that, when Player Min
moves right in all of these positions, she has found her optimal strategy and we can invoke Theorem
3.7 to show that the algorithm terminates in a linear number of steps—or simply stop when using the
alternative stopping condition.
The first observation is that changing the decision to moving left will not lead to an improvement, as
it produces a winning cycle of a quality (leading even colour) higher than the quality of any cycle avail-
able for Player Max under the current strategy of Player Min. Let us now consider the less significant
position j + 1. First, we observe that moving to the right is a superior strategy. This can easily be seen:
moving to the left produces a cycle with a dominating even colour and thus turns out to be winning for
Player Max. Moving to the right in position j+ 1 and (by our assumption) all more significant positions
removes this cycle and implies that the leading colour from this position is 1. This is clearly better for
Player Min. If Player Min uses a strategy where j + 1 is the most significant position where she decides
to move to the left, we have the following case distinctions for Player Max’s strategy in this simple cycle:
1. Player Max moves to the right in this simple cycle. Then moving to the right is also the optimal
counter strategy for Player Min, and her strategy will be updated accordingly.
9
2. Player Max does not move right in this simple cycle with her current strategy σ. Moving right in
this simple cycle is among Prof(σ), as one even colour is added to the set in the quality measure
in the local comparison. It is also the choice for the optimal counter strategy σcτ to the current
strategy τ of Player Min, as this is the only way for Player Max to produce a valuation with
the dominating even colour of this simple cycle, while to valuation with a higher even colour is
possible.
Taking these two cases into consideration, Player Min will move to the right in the j most significant
positions after 2j improvement steps. When Player Max has found his optimal strategy, we can invoke
Theorem 3.7 to show termination in linear steps for the algorithm.
There are similar arguments for all kinds of traps that Friedmann has developed for strategy im-
provement algorithms. We have not formalised these arguments on other instances, but provided the
number of iterations needed by our symmetric strategy improvement algorithm for all of them in the
next section.
Note that the way in which Friedmann traps asymmetric strategy improvement has proven to be
quite resistant to the improvement policy (snare [10], random facet [19, 3], globally optimal [25], etc.).
From the perspective of the traps, the different policies try to aim at a minor point in the mechanism
of the traps, and this minor point is adjusted. The central mechanism, however is not affected. All of
these examples have some variant of simple cycles at the heart of the counter and a deceleration lane to
orchestrate the timely counting.
Symmetric strategy improvement aims at the mechanism of the traps themselves. It seems that ex-
amples that trap symmetric strategy improvement algorithms need to do more than just trapping both
players (which could be done by copying the trap with inverse roles), they need to trap them simulta-
neously. It is not likely to find a proof that such traps do not exist, as this would imply a proof that
symmetric strategy improvement solves parity (or, depending on the proof, mean or discounted payoff)
games in polynomial time. But it seems that such traps would need a different structure. A further
difference to asymmetric strategy improvement is that the deceleration lane ceases to work.
Taking into account that finding traps for asymmetric strategy improvement took decades and was
very insightful, this looks like an interesting challenge for future research.
5 Experimental Results
We have implemented the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm for parity games and compared it
with the standard strategy improvement algorithm with the popular locally optimising and other switch-
ing rules. To generate various examples we used the tools steadygame and stratimprgen that
comes as a part of the parity game solver collection PGSOLVER [18]. We have compared the perfor-
mance of our algorith on parity games with 100 positions (see appendix) and found that the locally
optimising policy outperforms other switching rules. We therefore compare our symmetric strategy
improvement algorithm with the locally optimising strategy improvement below.
Since every iteration of both algorithms is rather similar—one iteration of our symmetric strategy
improvement algorithm essentially runs two copies of an iteration of a classical strategy improvement
algorithm—and can be performed in polynomial time, the key data to compare these algorithms is the
number of iterations taken by both algorithms.
Symmetric strategy improvement will often rule out improvements at individual positions: it disre-
gards profitable changes of Player Max and Min if they do not comply with σcτ and τ
c
σ, respectively. It is
well known that considering fewer updates can lead to a significant increase in the number of updates on
random examples and benchmarks. An algorithm based on the random-facet method [19, 3], e.g., needs
around a hundred iterations on the random examples with 100 positions we have drawn, simply because
it updates only a single position at a time. The same holds for a random-edge policy where only a single
position is updated. The figures for these two methods are given in the appendix.
It is therefore good news that symmetric strategy improvement does not display a similar weakness.
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Figure 3: These plots compare the performance of the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm (data
points in cyan circles) with standard strategy improvement using the locally optimising policy rule
(data points in orange squares). The plot on the left side is for random examples generated using the
steadygame 1000 2 4 3 5 6 command, while the plot on the right is for Friedmann’s trap from
the previous section generated by the command stratimprgen -pg switchallsubexp i.
It even uses less updates when compared to classic strategy improvement with the popular locally opti-
mising and locally random policy rules. Note also that having less updates can lead to a faster evaluation
of the update, because unchanged parts do not need to be re-evaluated [3].
As shown in Figure 3, the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm not only performs better (on
average) in comparison with the traditional strategy improvement algorithm with the locally optimising
policy rule, but also avoids Friedmann’s traps for the strategy improvement algorithm. The following
table shows the performance of symmetric strategy improvement algorithm for Friedmann’s traps for
other common switching rules. It is clear that our algorithm is not exponential for these classes of
examples.
Switch Rule 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cunningham 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30
CunninghamSubexp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
FearnleySubexp 4 7 11 13 17 21 25 29 33 37
FriedmannSubexp 4 9 13 15 19 23 27 31 35 39
RandomEdgeExpTest 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
RandomFacetSubexp 1 2 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
SwitchAllBestExp 4 5 8 11 12 13 15 17 18 19
SwitchAllBestSubExp 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
SwitchAllSubExp 3 5 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
SwitchAllExp 3 4 6 8 10 11 12 14 16 18
ZadehExp - 6 10 14 18 21 25 28 32 35
ZadehSubexp 5 9 13 16 20 23 27 30 34 37
6 Discussion
We have introduced symmetric approaches to strategy improvement, where the players take inspiration
from the respective other’s strategy when improving theirs. This creates a rather moderate overhead,
where each step is at most twice as expensive as a normal improvement step. For this moderate price,
we have shown that we can break the traps Friedmann has introduced to establish exponential bounds
for the different update policies in classic strategy improvement [11, 12, 13].
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In hindsight, attacking a symmetric problem with a symmetric approach seems so natural, that it is
quite surprising that it has not been attempted immediately. There are, however, good reasons for this,
but one should also consent that the claim is not entirely true: the concurrent update to the respective
optimal counter strategy has been considered quite early [11, 12, 13], but was dismissed, because it can
lead to cycles [5].
The first reason is therefore that it was folklore that symmetric strategy improvement does not work.
The second reason is that the argument for the techniques that we have developed in this paper would
have been restricted to beauty until some of the appeal of classic strategy improvement was caught in
Friedmann’s traps. Friedmann himself, however, remained optimistic:
We think that the strategy iteration still is a promising candidate for a polynomial time
algorithm, however it may be necessary to alter more of it than just the improvement policy.
This is precisely, what the introduction of symmetry and co-improvement tries to do.
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A Symmetric Strategy Improvement algorithm versus classic strategy
improvement algorithm with various switching rules
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Figure 4: These plots compare the performance of the symmetric strategy improvement algorithm (data
points in cyan circles) with standard strategy improvement using the locally optimising policy rule (data
points in orange squares), random-edge switching rule (data points in red triangles), random-facet rule
(data points in blue triangles), and switch-half rule (data point in green triangles). These plots are for
random examples generated using the steadygame 100 2 4 3 5 6 command from PGSolver.
The results from randomized switching rules (random-edge, random-facet, and switch-half) presented
here are taken as average number of iterations over four executions of the corresponding algorithms.
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